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Abstract - The high level of debt that characterizes 
the capital structure of companies has always been one 
of the biggest problems of the Italian economy. 
Traditionally, Italian enterprises especially the small 
and medium sized enterprises have a weak financial 
structure, due to a strong imbalance of funding sources 
in favour of debt. The under-capitalization of firms, and 
therefore their dependence on borrowed capital, makes 
them vulnerable to risks that can arise from changes in 
the environment and external variables, ensuring that 
they have more difficulties to face periods of financial 
crisis, such as the recent one that we are experiencing. 
In addition, the subordination of Italian companies to 
the banking system determines a lesser degree of 
independence, which is reflected in putting greater 
constraints in choosing the best investment 
opportunities. Firms that are characterized by a 
balanced capital structure are stronger, enjoy greater 
operational freedom and are able to deal adequately 
with the difficulties arising from sudden changes in the 
external environment. For these reasons it is useful to 
investigate what are the causes at the root of 
underfunding and solutions that can be taken in order 
to encourage companies to strengthen their capital 
structure. The objective of this study is to identify what 
are the most appropriate regulatory instruments for 
encouraging the companies to strengthen their capital 
structure and in particular to demonstrate the validity 
of a law that establishes a 100% corporate tax 
exemption in case of reinvesting the operating profit in 
the business. This is not a new rule in the international 
context; in fact it is still in force in Estonia. The rule is 
intended to encourage companies to retain earnings 
and reduce the phenomenon, which often occurs in 
Italy, consisting in the reduction of the tax base of the 
company through the introduction of discretionary 
costs (such as directors' fees), higher than the amount 
due. 
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1. INTRODUCTION & AIM OF THE RESEARCH 
 
To prove this thesis it was decided to simulate the effects 
of the introduction of the fiscal incentive on the financial 
statements and therefore on the results and financial 
performance of a sample of companies, by creating an 
empirical model that reproduced the logic and managerial 
choices resulting from the introduction of the measure. 
The empirical model was created and applied to each 
financial statement considering a number of basic 
assumptions; which have given rise to an equal number of 
quantitative results; can provide a measure of the 
effectiveness of the tax incentive.  
The empirical analysis has been accompanied by a survey 
on the perception of entrepreneurs on the Italian tax 
system by means of a series of surveys.  
Through this investigation it was possible to explore some 
issues of concern, for example: the taxation of business 
income, the Italian tax system as a whole and the 
incentives that it provides to facilitate the capitalization of 
companies considering the opinion of business owners.  
Elaborating on the results obtained jointly by empirical 
research and survey on the perception of entrepreneurs, 
the conclusion remarks have been constructed based on a 
comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
proposed law.  
The operational part of the work was supplemented by an 
in-depth analysis of the Italian economy, with particular 
reference to reality and to the aspects that characterize 
the management of small and medium-sized enterprises, 
and the research aimed to identify the causes behind the 
under-capitalization of the Italian firms and their 
dependence on debt capital.  
Moreover, taking into consideration some studies and 
researches that were conducted by other authors on the 
subject, it was possible to identify what are the features 
that a tax system should provide in order to encourage 
companies to strengthen their capital structure, and 
specifically what are the instruments, nature of tax or 
extra tax that allow achieving the best result in reducing 
the indebtedness of companies. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The literature on this topic identifies three main factors 
which over the years have led to the phenomenon of 
under-capitalization of the Italian companies.  
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The first is represented by the high degree of closure that 
marks the ownership structure of the Italian firms against 
the entry of new investors.  
The classical approach of the organizational structure of 
the Italian enterprises refers to the family firms.  
The characteristics of this approach are the following:  
 the control of the company is in the hands of a 
small number of members (on average 1 to 3)  
 the firm is controlled by an individual or by 
individuals linked by family relations  
 low degree of separation between the ownership 
and the management of the company 
 aversion to the entry of new shareholders in the 
company and therefore low intake of equity  
The combination of these characteristics may in part 
explain the low capitalization of the Italian companies; 
how the financial resources of an individual or a family 
could be sufficient for the initial phase of the life of the 
company.  
However, the increase in size requires a discontinuity in 
both the way the company is managed and the methods by 
which it obtains the financial resources it needs.  
A growing need not only for internal resources but also for 
external resources to find in the market, the increase in 
the size calls for a more decentralized decision-making 
through the use of the instrument of delegation of 
authority, which is often associated with the acquisition of 
more managerial resources, and so on.  
These changes in the organizational structure must 
necessarily be accompanied by a greater ability to raise 
external funds, which can reach up to the listing of the 
company.  
In Italy, the growth of the business seems to meet a limit 
connected with their ability to control the entrepreneur 
and his family, the company grows to the point where the 
controlling family is able to handle it.  
According to Bianchi et Al. (2005), the reluctance on the 
part of the Italian entrepreneurs to open governance 
structures of their companies and use the stock market to 
finance them seems to be motivated by the inadequacy of 
models of governance and financing of the company that 
can be practiced in Italy; such inadequacy in turn derives 
at least in part the inadequacy of legal instruments aimed 
at ensuring effective corporate governance.  
The analysis carried out by the authors shows that the 
reluctance of employers to give up control of the company 
or to share with new players is mainly linked to the fact 
that they are high in Italy compared to other advanced 
economies, the private benefits of "expropriation" of the 
control are difficult to defend and appropriated those 
"profitable."  
On one hand the entrepreneur heading a company needs 
more financial resources to ensure that it can grow, on the 
other hand does not intend to lose the benefits that derive 
from his exclusive control.  
Conversely, a person who is willing to enter into the 
corporate enterprise by providing financial resources 
wants a return on his investment and then is adverse to 
the exclusive control held by the entrepreneur. From this 
conflict of interest arises the closure of the Italian business 
ownership for the entrance of new investors and this 
means that the only source of financing available to fuel 
the growth of business activity is constituted by the third-
party capital.  
The second cause of the imbalance of the Italian firms in 
the choice of financing is represented by the high tax 
burden on the Italian companies, on average, higher than 
the main major European countries.  
Considering the effect the study by the World Bank , the 
total tax rate  on businesses is equal to 65.8%, the highest 
value recorded to one of the most developed countries.  
Among the countries considered by the study, France has a 
value equal to 64.7%, in the U.S. 46.3% and the UK to 
34.0%.  
The third factor that has historically influenced in an 
important way the financing choices of the entrepreneurs, 
making them lean towards the debt capital, is the 
deductibility of interest expense.  
Historically, the Italian legal system, like most of the tax 
systems, has provided tax treatment of interest expense 
and then the third-party capital, cheaper than that 
accorded to the cost of equity capital.  
Until the 90s was in fact planned a full deductibility of the 
cost of debt, i.e. interest expense arising from borrowings 
undertaken by the company, and did not include any 
possibility to deduct the cost of capital.  
Consequently, it has come to create a gap between the cost 
of financing through the debt capital (lowest) and the cost 
of financing through equity (the highest). This 
discrimination of funding sources has led to the increasing 
indebtedness of companies, an incentive to increase the 
amount of debt of the company, since the cost of financing 
was fully deductible.  
In particular, the high tax burden combined with the 
ability of firms to deduct interest expense has meant that 
the use of debt capital appears under the tax aspect, much 
cheaper than the increase in equity. 
Solutions adopted by the Italian Government  
To solve the problem of underfunding and to limit the use 
of debt by firms, the Italian government has introduced 
over the years a series of measures.  
Among these, the last in order of time were the 
introduction of the "mechanism ROL" and '"incentive 
ACE."  
The first, introduced in 2007, limits the deductibility of 
interest in order to promote the capitalization of the 
companies. This rule provides that the interest expense 
can be deducted from taxable income up to the amount of 
interest income and the excess is deductible to the extent 
of 30% of gross operating profit  (ROL). 
The introduction of the ROL mechanism has not, however, 
eliminated the difference of treatment between the two 
sources of funding.  
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In order to make the neutral taxation in respect of the 
financing choices was introduced in 2011, the “Allowance 
for Corporate Equity” (ACE), it consists of an incentive to 
the capitalization of the companies realized through a 
reduction in the tax burden on income resulting from 
payments venture capital, and is based on applying a 
notional return on equity calculated on the increase, which 
will make then deductible for corporation tax purposes.  
It provides for the deduction from the taxable amount of 
any increase in equity of the company made during the 
year by a percentage equal to 3% in the first three years of 
application of the rule (2012-2014). The notional return of 
new equity that is determined by applying the rate of 3% 
to the increases of capital is compared to the existing one 
at the end of the year to 31 December 2010.  
The introduction of this incentive has helped to reduce the 
gap between the cost of debt and the equity.  
Incentives for business capitalization  
In 2008 an important and huge study was made by the 
European Commission with the extent of investigating on 
effects of different tax systems on the capital structure of 
companies and their role in encouraging the 
entrepreneurs to increase the net assets of their business.  
Specifically, the project aims to identify the tax measures 
that have an important impact on the decisions of the 
entrepreneurs, particularly with respect to the owners of 
small and medium-sized enterprises, regarding the choice 
between reinvesting profits in the company and their 
distribution. The aim is also to highlight what are the tax 
obstacles to increases in equity capital currently existing 
in the different legal systems of European states.  
The study identified three types of tax systems:  
 those that take clear measures in favour of 
reinvestment of profits  
 those that encourage more entrepreneurs to 
distribute profits  
 neutral ones, i.e. those tax systems in which there 
are no rules that favour particularly the 
distribution or reinvestment of profits  
An examination shows that a few countries promote a 
clear and systematic reinvestment of profits in the 
company and therefore the strengthening of its capital 
structure. Only Estonia, Ireland, Lithuania, Slovenia and 
Sweden in recent years have implemented specific policies 
in this direction.  
In these countries, the set of tax rules is aimed to further 
promote the use of debt capital rather than equity and the 
use of self.  
Tax systems of the remaining countries are considered 
neutral, and in these countries have not been adopted 
fiscal measures with the aim to foster in a predominantly 
one or the other form of financing.  
Are considered neutral tax systems, even those where 
there are incentives to the capitalization of the companies, 
but at the same time, were also provided with the rules 
that limit the effects.  
This category also includes the Italian tax system, which is 
considered neutral because it does not provide tax rules 
designed to encourage clearly one or the other form of 
financing.  
In general it can be said that tax systems that require a 
lower level of taxation on business income or those that 
provide the possibility of deferring the payment of tax, in 
combination with the presence of relatively high tax rates 
on dividends and income of individuals, have a strong 
influence on the decisions of entrepreneurs, as they offer a 
strong incentive to invest their resources in an enterprise.  
It is important to note that both the level of taxation that 
the differences between the tax rates have an impact on 
the choices made by entrepreneurs / investors.  
Theoretically, in fact, a high level of taxation on corporate 
income, when combined with a level of very high taxation 
of dividends should favour the retention of earnings, but 
in reality, however, this combination leads to a 
disappointing result because it can have the ' undesirable 
effect of reducing the spirit of entrepreneurship in the 
country, as well as to promote the development of the 
black market and cause capital flight to tax systems more.  
Measures that have proved more effective in boosting the 
market capitalization of the companies are as follows:  
Low tax rates on business income (especially if the lower 
rate of tax on private income).  
The empirical results of the analysis say that a low level of 
tax rates applied to corporate income push entrepreneurs 
to retain earnings in the company, and this is confirmed by 
the entrepreneurs themselves and the analysis of capital 
structures of companies resident in countries that have 
adopted a lower level of corporate taxation.  
This effect is amplified if the rate of corporation tax is 
lower than the burden on private income; in this case, the 
entrepreneur who did not need to use the net proceeds for 
the private expenditure has a tax incentive reinvest profits 
in the company.  
Deferral of taxation of business income  
The deferral of corporate taxation is a tax measure that is 
to defer the taxation of business income at the time of 
distribution of profits; the tax liability of the company 
towards the tax authority arises when an enterprise 
distributes profits and until that time does not apply any 
tax rate on income earned.  
This tax system is currently in force in Estonia, which, with 
reference to businesses, has one of the lowest debt ratios 
among the 19 examined by the study.  
The results of the investigations made to Estonian 
entrepreneurs show that they are strongly convinced that 
this measure will promote the reinvestment of profits in 
the business.  
Tax Rate on dividends higher than tax rate on capital gains  
A tax system that imposes a tax rate on dividends greater 
than the tax rate on capital gains certainly encourages 
business owners to retain earnings in the company in 
anticipation of a future capital gain related to the sale of 
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the shares of the company, rather than paying higher taxes 
on dividends received .  
Ultimately, the study showed that countries whose firms 
are on average the lowest debt ratios are those that have 
adopted clear incentives to the capitalization of the 
companies. Among the measures adopted one that shows 
greater efficacy seems to be the solution adopted in 
Estonia, which provides a tax exemption of business 
income and the taxation of profits distributed only to 
members. The superiority of this solution lies primarily in 
its ease of understanding; entrepreneurs recognize the 
intent of the standard and its incentive effect. 
 
3. RESEARCH HYPOTESIS 
 
An analysis of the literature shows that a good solution to 
solve the problem of under-capitalization of the Italian 
companies would be the introduction of a rule which 
provides for no taxation to the reinvested earnings in the 
enterprise. In particular, this rule provides that the 
company will no longer be taxed on income earned during 
the year, it is expected that they are taxed only amounts 
that are distributed by the company to its shareholders.  
Its aim is, on one hand, to encourage the entrepreneurs to 
reinvest the profits of the enterprise, on the other hand to 
reduce the phenomenon of tax evasion and avoidance 
which are very common in Italy.  
What would be the economic effects of the introduction of 
this solution in the Italian context?  
What are the advantages and disadvantages that it would 
entail?  
What is the perception that the entrepreneurs have today 
about the Italian tax system and the incentives for their 
businesses, and how would welcome the introduction of a 
rule such as the one described above?  
To answer these questions, two different researches have 
been carried out; on one side is a simulation was made of 
the economic effects of the measure on the financial 
statements of a sample of small and medium-sized 
businesses through the application of an empirical model, 
on the other side was carried out a survey with the 
entrepreneurs to understand what are the characteristics 
of Italian companies with particular regard to their 
relationship with the tax authorities and what is the 
opinion of the entrepreneurs about the tax system and tax 
incentives. It was possible to carry out the investigation 
with the support provided by the API (Association of Small 
and Medium-sized Enterprises and the Province of Turin) 
who submitted the questionnaire to its members. 
 
4. SAMPLE AND PERIOD 
 
As for the simulation of the economic effects on the 
financial statements of the Italian companies, the study 
considered a sample consisting of a total of 187 companies 
from different Italian regions and sectors of activities.  
Only small and medium-sized companies, therefore having 
a workforce of less than 250, a turnover not exceeding 
EUR 50 million or total assets maximum of 50 million 
were analyzed. 
Also the companies analyzed, are unlisted companies, 
whose financial statements are available for 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011 and 2012.  
In addition, companies that make up the sample are those 
whose shareholder of reference are only individuals or 
families; thus were excluded from the research companies 
belonging to group structures; whose business and 
financial results could be affected by the logical group.  
Sampling, with the exception of the conditions presented 
above, was done randomly in order to best represent the 
composition of the Italian companies.  
The survey carried out among business owners has been 
about 111 business owners of small and medium size of 
the province of Turin belonging to different operating 
sectors.  
The sample is constituted by 37% of micro enterprises, 
50% of small firms and 13% for medium-sized 
companies1. 
 
5. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 
To simulate the economic effect of the tax incentive on the 
firms in our sample, we have created a theoretical model. 
Using the Microsoft Excel, it has been possible to apply the 
model to the financial statements of the companies in the 
sample to determine the overall effects on their financial 
structure and profitability. Below are exposed to the 
assumptions underlying the empirical model.  
The tax incentive provides that:  
 Operating income of the company does not bear 
any kind of tax, therefore, the operating profit of 
the company coincides with the pre-tax profit 
from the application of civil law  
 only the amounts that will be distributed to 
shareholders as dividends will be subject to tax, 
where applicable, will apply a single rate and 
dividends received will not be subject to further 
taxation for the purposes of the tax on individuals  
The introduction of the incentive results in a tax savings 
for the company, equal to the amount of income taxes 
payable in the absence of 'incentive; which is an increase 
in the operating result and therefore the net assets of the 
company.  
                                                          
1 For the purposes of the study were considered:  
 micro enterprises: number of employees less than 10 and turnover 
less than EUR 1 million or total assets less than EUR 1 million  
 small business: number of employees from 11 to 50, turnover of less 
than EUR 5 million or total assets of less than € 5 million  
 medium-sized enterprises: the number of employees between 51 
and 250, turnover of less than EUR 50 million to EUR or total assets 
of less than EUR 50 million  
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The model considers that the increase in the equity of the 
company will lead to an increase of assets or a decrease in 
liabilities.  
The companies that have a debt to equity ratio  of less than 
1 are treated as companies with a balanced capital 
structure, firms with a debt to equity ratio greater than 1 
are considered undercapitalized. 
The empirical model expects that firms with a balanced 
financial structure use the tax savings to increase assets. 
For indebted enterprises, it has been considered both the 
case in which the increase of equity coincides with the 
increase of the asset, and the case in which it coincides 
with the decrease of the passive (in particular of financial 
liabilities).  
The model is also based on two additional assumptions:  
 the introduction of the rule has no effect on the 
profitability of the company 
 the operating results of the company is fully 
reinvested  
In the event that the company uses the most efficient way 
of reducing debt, borrowing costs are calculated based on 
the interest applied to the company in the absence of the 
rule.  
Finally, the model considers a further scene, according to 
which the rule may also have an effect in discouraging the 
entrepreneurs to avoid the corporation tax, in terms of 
charging the profit and loss account of the company in the 
amount of deductible costs higher than those actually 
incurred. To find out which companies are using this 
mechanism; a comparison was made between the return 
on equity for each business (considering the average value 
over the period 2008-12), and the profitability of risk-free 
assets (considering the same period): firms that have 
lower profitability than that of risk-free assets are those 
that have used policies of "tax efficiency".  
With the introduction of the norm these firms would be 
encouraged to minimize their profit before tax, to simulate 
this effect on the financial statements of the companies it 
has been hypothesized that, compared to the first 
hypothesis, the costs have decreased by 1%. This 
percentage has been chosen in an arbitrary manner and is 





The survey carried out by the entrepreneurs in the 
Province of Turin reveals that they believe that the 
current tax system is composed of a number of 
standards that are too high and it is in general 
unclear if not understandable.  
This causes a significant amount of energy and 
resources from the companies that in most of the 
cases, for the management of fiscal issues making, 
use external consultants.  
In addition, they believe that the tax system does not 
incentivize businesses in a particular way to reduce 
debt.  
Despite the introduction of the incentive ACE in 2011 
which had the goal of making neutral taxation in 
respect of the Company's financing choices to boost 
the capitalization of the companies, the majority of 
the entrepreneurs consider that, from the point of 
view of taxation, the use of debt capital to finance the 
company's activities is the most convenient recourse 
to equity. This means that there is a problem with the 
lack of clarity and complexity of the rules that must 
be solved.  
In the questionnaire, the entrepreneurs were asked 
about what they thought of a rule which provides for 
the taxation of reinvested earnings in the company; 
almost all the entrepreneurs responded in a positive 
manner. I n particular, 75% stated that they would 
welcome it in absolutely in favour of the introduction 
of the incentive because they believe that it is valid 
way to promote the capitalization of the companies 
and the use of self-financing and the use of own 
capital to finance enterprises.  
Relevant information were also detected on the 
composition of the corporate enterprises and the 
role of the business owner in corporate management: 
most of the companies are controlled by a number of 
members between 1 and 3, in most of the cases, the 
members are also directors of the company and only 
1% of cases; the management of the activity was 
exclusively entrusted to external managers. Given 
that the shareholders are also directors of the 
company, and thus intervene directly in its 
management, the remuneration paid to the directors 
may represent a form of alternative distribution to 
the distribution of profits. Therefore it is very likely 
that they can "inflate" the remuneration of directors 
in order to subtract a portion of the profits from the 
taxable amount calculated for the purposes of 
corporation tax.  
The empirical analysis carried out shows that the 
effects of the introduction of the tax incentive on the 
capital structure of Italian companies, as well as on 
their ability to meet their commitments to the 
lenders, are very positive. Considering the results 
obtained on the sample, the leverage, expressed as 
the ratio between the debt of the company and its 
shareholders' equity was reduced (considering the 
average value from 2008 to 2012) of 68% with the 
introduction the tax incentive, from a mean value of 
4.8 in the absence of the tax incentive, to an average 
value of 1.5 with the adoption of the standard.  
          International Research Journal of Engineering and Technology (IRJET)      e-ISSN: 2395 -0056 
               Volume: 02 Issue: 03 | June-2015                       www.irjet.net                                                              p-ISSN: 2395-0072 
 
© 2015, IRJET.NET- All Rights Reserved  Page 2300 
 
This means that if firms have an average amount of 
financial liabilities that amounted to almost five 
times the value of the net assets of the company, with 
the introduction of the incentive the amount of debt 
would be reduced to a value that is equal to one and 
a half times that of equity.  
This is the effect that the incentive would result in 
the case where the most indebted companies decide 
to use the financial resources arising from tax 
savings to repay part of their debts. In case you 
decide instead to use them to increase the value of its 
assets, leaving unchanged the value of the debt, the 
Debt to Equity ratio decreased on average by 52%, 
from a value of 4.8 to a value of 2.3  
Although the effect on the return on equity is 
important, in the absence of the tax incentive if the 
average ROE is equal to 2.35%, with the introduction 
of the standard, it becomes equal to 14.25% in the 
first case and 13.30% considering the second. This is 
due to both the increase in net income resulting from 
the tax exemption of business income, and the 
reduction of financial expenses recorded in the 
income statement. The coverage of financial 
expenses, equal to the ratio between EBITDA  and the 
total financial expense, grows by 260% in the first 
case and 7% in the second.  
The results were obtained from a sample of 187 
firms, which is consistent though, it may not 
accurately represent the effect that the rule would 
have on the whole total of the Italian companies, if 
not in terms of quality.  
However, the improvements that normally produce 
on capital ratios and return on equity are net; all of 
the analyzed companies have seen a reduction in 




The analysis has carried out that it can be stated 
definitely that the introduction of a rule which 
provides for no taxation of reinvested earnings in the 
enterprise has an important effect in stimulating the 
market capitalization of the companies.  
The average debt drops significantly, while greatly 
increases the return on equity of companies, thanks 
to lower financial expenses on the profit for the year, 
resulting due to the decrease of debt. In particular, 
the effect produced by the rule on debt indebtedness 
is as strong as most companies use the tax savings in 
order to repay the debt.  
The element that determines the success of this 
standard is mainly represented by its simplicity: in 
the eyes of employers, as demonstrated by the 
survey carried out by other studies  and, is very clear 
that the incentive effect of the rule, and also they are 
in favour of its introduction into the Italian system.  
Its introduction would inevitably create a consistent 
effort on the part of the state's finances. Taking into 
consideration the tax revenue guaranteed exemption 
from corporate income tax and from the regional tax 
on productive activities, which amounted in 2011 to 
about 69.7 billion euro (37.7 billion for IRES and 32 
billion for ' IRAP), and represents a total of 15.7% of 
the total tax revenue of the state currents 
(amounting to 4.5 percentage points of GDP) .  
The empirical analysis carried out can not give a 
quantitative measure in terms of the overall 
economic benefits produced by the standard on the 
Italian economic system, as well as on the State 
Budget. However, the qualitative results obtained 
from the research show that the benefits related to 
the implementation of this standard may be higher 
than the costs it requires.  
It should be also considered an additional effect 
related to the implementation of the tax incentive. It 
acts as a disincentive for companies to use strategies 
of "tax efficiency", i.e. they minimize the income 
before taxes for the sole purpose of reducing its tax 
burden. If the income is tax-free enterprise, there are 
no incentives by employers to declare a profit of less 
than "real", so the rule would bring out a part of the 
income that today are taken away from corporate 
taxation.  
Using the empirical model has also tried to measure 
the effect on the indices of financial structure and 
profitability of firms. The results show a further 
improvement, but turns out to be particularly 
difficult to define to what extent can increase the 
level of profits reported by the companies.  
Finally, we must consider that; despite of that the 
cost of the incentive in terms of loss of tax revenue 
for the treasury, is high, a portion of these resources 
would be recovered in the event that the shares of 
the company are sold and that more resources 
arising from the tax savings could be used by 
companies to increase their production capacity or to 
undertake projects that today cannot be achieved 
with the financial resources they have. Such actions 
would have strong positive effects on the level of 
employment in the country and would also involve 
an increase in the revenue from the indirect taxes 
such as consumption tax.  
A further advantage would lie in the increased 
capacity of the Italian economy to attract foreign 
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investment. It is difficult to quantify the effect of the 
rule on these variables, but the tax exemption of 
business income can be seen not only as a simple tax 
incentive, but as a real benefit for enterprise and 
employment, and so it can have significant effects on 
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